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. 1. SUMMARY: Appellant sued on behalf of himself and 
a class for declaratory and injunctive relief on the gfounds 
--..... 
I 
that the automobile repossession and resale provisions of the 
Illinois Commercial Code were unconstitutional. The heart 
of the six count complaint at issue was the constitutionality 
of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, §§ 9-503 and 9-504 allowing private 
repossession by creditors without prior notice and a hearing to 
t. 
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the debtors. The relevant statutes are in an appendix to 
the Jurisdictional Statement. The 3-judge court dismissed 
the suit for lack of standing of the named plaintiffs, and 
held that giving the relief requested would be a "useless act." 
'--- ----
The class action was also dismissed. 
2o FACTS: Appellant Gonzalez was one of four named 
plaintiffs. Three, including Gonzalez, alleged almost identical 
factual situations. In each case, the debtor-appellant granted 
the creditor-appellee a purchase money security interest in a 
used automobile. The creditor summarily repossessed the car, 
. . 
applied for and received repossession title, and resold it to 
a third party not involved in the litigation. In each case, 
Gonzalez and the two other debtors alleged that there was no 
default at the time the automobile was repossessed. 
_ . .,..-
The 3-judge court began by noting that the Commercial 
Code expressly conditions a creditor's right to repossession upon 
the existence of an actual, bona fide default. Ill. Rev. Stat., 
ch. 26, §§ 1-203, 9-501(1), 9-503, 9-504. Moreover, use of Ill. 
Rev. Stat., ch. 95 1/2, §§ 3-114(b), 3-116(b) and 3-612 is con-
tingent upon a lawful and proper transfer of interest in the auto-
mobile. · Each complaint alleged a violation of the statute, since the 
debtor claimed there was no default. "Thus, in a case where they 
assert that the repossession and resale provisions of the Illinois 
Code were used improperly and maliciously against them, plaintiffs 
ask this Court to determine the va~idity of these statutes when 






were correct, the court stated, they would have a damage 
remedy under§ 9-507 of the Illinois Commercial Code for 
·wrongful conversion, but lacked standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the statutes, since their claim was that 
these statutes were violated. 
The court further stated that since the automobiles of 
Gonzalez, and another plaintiff, had already been repossessed 
and resold, with titles transferred, before either party had 
joined the action, injunctive relief would be a "useless act." 
This holding was also couched in standing terms. 
Since the representatives lacked standing, they could 
not represent the class, and the complaint was dismissed. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
a. Appellant 
Appellant says his claim was for notice and a 
hearing before repossession, and that no subsequent determination 
of the validity or invalidity of the repossession can affect his 
-
constitutional right. He relies on @1entes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 
67 (1972), which dealt exclusively with the claim to notice and a 
hearing before summary replevin of goods. He cites language in 
J~ 
Fuentes to effect that "no later hearing and no damage award can 
~ 
undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the 
right of procedural due process has already occurred." 407 U.S., 
at 81-82. 
On the question of default, he claims no other 






dismissed for standing on the failure to allege the complainant 
was in default (see JoS., at 11), and says the court ruling 
"amounts to stating that a person who pays his bills has no 
right to a hearing before his property is taken away from him." 
J.S., at 11. He asks that the standing holding be reversed and 
that the case be remanded fo~ a determination on the merits. 
As to that part of the court's opinion sounding 
in mootness, ~-, that injunctive relief was impossible because 
the automobile had already been repossessed, title transferred 
and sold, appellant says this is also inconsistent with Fuentes, 
where the plaintiffs had already had their property taken away 
from themo Also, the constitutional violation would otherwise 
be capable of repetition but evadtng review. Moore v. Ogilvie, 
394 UoSo 815 (1969). Finally, even if the injunctive rellef 
~~ 
~..,  requested were 
not. 
moot, damages for the unconstitutional taking were 
,e 
b. Appellee 
The creditor-repossessor, Mercantile National Bank 
of Chicago, first argues . that the · suit should be dismissed for 
want ·of jurisdiction because the suit should not have been before 
a 3-judge court and, even if it should ·have been, appeal should -have lied to the CA and not directly here. The main point made 
is that the ruling below was on standing and not the merits. No ----case of this Court is cited for this proposition, which must be/ 
that a dismissal on standing gr~unds is not an order granting or 






Appellee also argues that this is not a suit 
seeking to restrain the action of a state official in the 
"enforcement or execution" of .a state statute, and thus does 
not require a 3-judge court under 28 UoS.Co 2281. The Secretary 
of State was named as a defendant in the suit, but appellee claims 
the Secretary of State has nothing to do with the private re-
possession; he merely recognizes a transfer of title of the motor 
vehicle which has already taken place by a mere ministerial act. 
The Secretary of State is only a nominal defendant and the 
requirement of§ 2281 'is not satisfied by joining, as nominal 
parties defendant, state officers whose action is not the effective 
means of the enforcement or execution of the challenged statute." 
Wilentz v. Sovereign Camp, WoO .W., 306 U.S. 573, 579-80 (1939); 
Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.So 97, 102 (1967)0 Appellee cites 
district court cases holding that this kind of action is improper 
for 3-judge court determination -- Nicholas v. Tower Grove Bank, 
362 F. Supp . 374, 377-78 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Kirksey Vo Theilig, 351 
F. Suppo 727, 729-32 (D. Colo. 1972); Gibbs v. Titelman, No. 72-
2165 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Motion of Appellee, at App . 12). 
Appellee argues in the alternative that the 3-judge 
court should be affirmed, and that its ruling on standing and the 
class action was correct. Appellee argues there is no "capable of 
repetition" problem, since numerous courts have ruled on the merits 
of suits of this kind. 
4. DISCUSSION: The standing ruling of the 3-judge court 







you are in default to claim a right to prior notice and 
hearing before respossession, and the injunction would not be 
·useless gp, to the future enjoining of the statute as uncon-
stitutional, on the "capable of repetition" rationale, and~ 
\.., )1.JJ,~ 
damagesAror an unconstitutional taking in the instant suit. 
This is the clear implication of Fuentes and nothing in Mitchell 
v. Grant, No. 72-6160, is likely to change that. 
As to the jurisdictional question, the first point of 
appellee, that you cannot have direct appeal to this Court because 
relief was denied on standing grounds, seems doubtful. There is no 
case of this Court that I know of which stands for that proposition. 
The second argument of appellee is a harder one, that a 3-judge 
court should not have been convened in the first place because 
appellant did not seek to restr ain the act of a state official. In 
addressing this question, a number of considerations may come into 
play: (1) there were other counts of the complaint aimed at the 
Secretary of State's role in validating title transfers -- this may 
be "ministerial," but it is some form of action, and arguably would 
not be permitted if appellant succeeded on the merits; (2) to some 
extent this question is ti~d into the ultimate question in the suit, 
whether there is state action in private repossession, an issue which 
lower courts have split on. Assuming one could rule there was state 
action, would it follow that there was state participation in the 
enforcement of the statute, thus undercutting appellee's arguments 








This issue at least seems close. Perhaps the best 
thing to do, if the Court disagrees with the standing below, 
is to note and postpone jurisdiction to the merits. The best 
argument in appellees' favor is the cited cases of the lower 
courts, holding attacks of this kind appropriate for single 
judge disposition, but there .seems to be no case of this Court 




There is a motion to DWJ/or AFFIRM. 
Scott Opinion of 
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No. 73-858 
Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union 
I The 3 j USDC is probably wrong on both its standing 
and mootness holdings. But I don't think this is properly a 
3 j USDC case, due to the minimal involvement of a state 
officer. The relevant statute, 28 USC 2281, refers specifically 
to an injunction "restraining the action 1111 of any officer of 
[a) ~ in the enforcement or execution of [the challenged] 
statute •••• " The mainstream II of this case is plainly not 
the enjoining of the actions of a state officer. You should 
either vacate and remand for the • entry of judgment by a 
single judge (allowing appeal to the CA) or postpone juris 
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Memorandum for the Conference. 
I took this case off of Tuesday's order list in order to 
circulate the following: 
Appellant Gollzalez, whose automobile was repossessed 
by appellee Mercantile National Bank of Chicago, sued 
on behalf of himself and a class, under 28 U. S. C. § 1983, 
claiming that §§ 9-503 and 9-504 of the Illinois Com-
mercial Code were unconstitutional insofar as these sec-
tions permit and authorize the repossession and subse-
quent sale of a debtor's property upon an alleged default 
,Yithout prior notice or opportunity to be heard. A 
three-judge court dismissed the complaint for lack of 
standing. 363 F. Supp. 143 (ND Ill . 1973). The court 
observed that the transaction of which plaintiff com-
plained involved an alleged violation of the challenged 
statutes. The court reasoned that if appellant was not 
in default, as alleged, his remedy was for damages for 
wrongful conversion, under § 9-507 of the Illinois Code, 
and that since the automobile of Gonzalez had already 
been repossessed and resold, a.nd title transferred by the 
Secretary of State before Gonzalez became a named 
plaintiff in the action, granting declaratory and inj unc-
tive relief would be a "useless act." 
Appellant asserts that damages for wrongful conversion 
is not an adequate remedy for the injury suffered as a 
- -
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result of losing possession of his automobile without 
prior notice and a hearing, and relies on Fuentes v. 
Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 81-82 (1972), where the Court 
stated "no later hearing and no damage award can undo 
the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the 
right of procedural due process has already occurred." 
Appellant points out that the three-judge court ruling 
amounts to stating that a person who pays his bills has 
no constitutionally enforceable right to a hearing before 
his property is taken away from him. 
Since the working assumption in Fuentes, as in) 
Sniaclach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969), 
was that the violation of a constitutional right is not 
adequately compensated by a damage remedy,1 this case 
poses an issue of substantial importance. 
In my view, the holding of the District Court that the 
granting of declaratory and injunctive relief would be a 
"useless act," in light of the subsequent sale and transfer 
of title, is only subsidiary to its holding that damages are 
an adequate remedy for the claimed due process violation. 
I.fz _ in fact, the violation of a constitutional right is an 
identifiable and separate miury, the ent!)' of declaratory 
and inju'iictive relief would not be "useless." It is cer-
tainly arguab e t 1at to t 1e extent the District Court 
meant to indicate that t.he case is moot, which it did not 
explicitly state, the speed of resale and transfer of title 
before a damage action may be heard, indicates that the 
1 If thr District Court is correct ns to stnnding, it cnlls into ques-
iion not on!~- thr rntion:1lr of Fuentes, but the approarhe,: in Mitchell 
Y. Grant. No. 72-6160. and Arnett Y. K ennedy, ;{o. 72-1118, as "·rll , 
since it suggests that both petitioners should have been dismissed 
for standing. Mitchell could have obtained dnmages for a wrong-
ful!~· issued \Hit of seque::;trat ion , a.nd Arnett could haYe recrived 
bnckpay, if wrongfull~· terminated. Thr npproach of the Dist rict 
Court ultimately \\·011ld seem to ,:uggest that petitioner in Arnett 
would onl!· hnYe stnnding to rnise the due proce,:s issue if he claimed 
that hr was proprr]~, terminated , thus rnnking backpay unarnilable. 
- -
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controversy is "capable of repetition yet evading review." 
Southern Pacific Termirial Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 _ 
(1911). In any event, if the Court considers this case 
moot, it should dismiss for want of jurisdiction, since the 
District Court did not so hold.~ 
If the suit should not have been dismissed for standing 
or mootness, an issue of major importance is presented 
as to whether· there is state action when creditors avail 
themselves of self-help remedies pursuant to the Illinois 
Commercial Code. See Adams v. Southern California 
First National Bank, - F. 2d - (CA9 1973) . Cf. 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F. 2d 754 (CA3 
1973), cert. granted, - U.S. - (February 19, 1974). 
Appellees also argue that due to the lack of state 
action the case was not appropriate for disposition by a 
three-judge court. They argue that the actual reposses-
sion by the creditor did not constitute "enforcement or 
execution" of a state statute, under 28 U. S. C. ~ 2281, 
and that the transfer of title by the Secretary of State 
pursuant to Illinois statutes was, in effect, a ministerial 
act. This also is an issue of some complexity, since 
appellee appears to argue that disposition by a three-
judge court was improper even if, on the merits. the 
District Court might have found state action sufficient 
to reach the merits of the due process claim. 
The holding with respect to standing is important and 
highly questionable if debtors not in default are to pre-
vent violation of their asserted rights to due process. 
It obviously deserves plenary consideration; but because 
the issues of mootness ru1d the jurisdiction of the three-
2 The mootness issue is also presented in No. 73-6042, Hight v. 
Belgrade State Bank, on the February 22, 1974 Conference List. 
ln t hat case, however, petitioner signed and transferred title to the 
car to the original seller after ent ry of judgment in respondents' 
favor in the trial court . The creditor apparent!:-' did not act 
unilaterally, as in the instant case, to sell the repossessed ca r and 
transfer title. 
- -
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judge court raise substantial questions,3 I would postpone 
jurisdiction to the merits. 
3 Alternatively, I would suggest holding this case pending appear 
in the Adams case, which is likely to be well briefed and the focus 
of critical comment, and raises the same state action and due process 
issues as this case. In Adams, the plaintiff had his car repossessed 
and sold before bringing suit, and the District Court did not attach 
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Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit 
Union, Merchantile National Bank of 
Chica~ etc. 
is ,; a s tumfuiry memo, priin~rily as\·a:-C}."memory jog" 
kl; .... ....f).'-"!r:-· 
and issue presefited by th~ ~above case. This 
specific analysis,? and reflects only 
-- _ _..,, ., . 
'and supe,;ficial . viewpoint. ~-
.d,· 
This is an appeal from an Illinois three judge 
in which we postponed the jurisdictional issues 
hear the case. :l" .. _ :i~")].f~~ 'oj •-, .. 
I must say, from a preliminary reading of the briefs, 
~ think the case should be dismissed as iaprovidently 
granted. The facts, issues and opinion of the DC, together 
with subsequent settlement in whole or in part of all of the 
~laims, leaves the case in a position in which there seems to 
me to be no clear cut issue. Moreover, the Secretary of State 
of Illinois has substantially amended the procedure followed · 
by him with respect to the issuance of "repossession certificates 
of title" to motor vehicles, and this in itself may make the 
case moot. 
The case, purporting to be a class action, is an 
on the constitutionality of the Illinois Uniform 
and the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code, as 
relate to the'.'l repossession of automobiles upon default in 
paymant of deferred installments and the issuance of repossession 
certificates of title by the Illinois Secretary of State. This 
is a 1983 sui~ for an injunction, declaratory judgment, and 
for compensatory and punitive damages, /.- In view of the 
asserted state action, involving a statute of statewide 
applicability and with the Secr~tary of State named as a 
' 
defendant, a three judge court was convened. On the basis 
of affidavits, that court dismissed r.: the case on two grounds: 
~.- ;ij_'a-:,, __ ;1 .... • • 
(l) lack of standing by the parties to maintain the action, 
and (ii) mootness ;1r,because the automobiles of the plaintiffs 
had already been ' repossessed, resold, with titles transferred 
individuals who were not joined 'ls parties. ·l~-, .~ 
Thfs suit also was dismissed 
ground that there must alwaJs oe ~.a named party with , 
standing who fs entitled to maintain the suit as 
the class he purports to represent. Absent such a 
case"; the DC dismissed the class action suit.:,!_:.l.r,, 
facts are difficult to state, as they vary from 
....... ~ ""r.:. . __ .-,A',_ .... 
.::,:, 
..... ....... ~:.~, ~;'-
_time to time, as did the parties and their status. One is 
t;JJ 
~·, inclined to believe that the suit must have been a "manufactured 
one", and that the named parties are being financed by someone 






The suit was originally brought by Mojica on March 
1972. ~ In July 1972, the Secretary of State proposed a new 
procedure wit~1respect to the issuance of repossession ~ 
title certificates, :~ procedure which included rather elaborate 
provisions for notice and opportun~ty to object / (See Appellee's 
Brief, p. 5). ro Appellee states in its Brief that 
1972, Mojica approved the Secretary of State's new rules 
Thereafter, on 
the litigation with 
with new defendants including Merchantile National Baille of 
Chicago. 'ii •="·· · • 
The DC decided the case _ 
apparently all four of the plaintiffs remained in the 
We are now ~told that "all named plaintiffs other 
by Appellee's Brief (p. 9) that Gonzalez - the sole remaining 
named plaintiff - has settled his claim for damages 
(originally in the amount of $62,000) for $750. Gonzalez 
persists, however, in maintaining the class action on behalf 
all others who may be similarly 
:t, •-;. < A ' • ••:t·• ~. y . -:-.;. 
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appellee contends 
appeal to this Court is no longer available 
where~ three judge court dismisses a case on grounds either 
of mootness or lack of standing, citing Rosado v. Wyman, 395 
U.S. 826 and 9 Moore's Federal Practice: < It is argued that 
even at the commencement of the litigation, there was no ... 
basis for either injunctive or declaratory relief ~; and hence 
no case or controversy. The automobiles had been seized and 
resold, and the purchasers . were: n9t"named as parties. No 
effective dmjunctive or decla~~~ory relief could be given. 
: ;.?·r!r. Moreover, subsequently tl!,ereto (but before the amended 
complaint was filed) the Secretary of State adopted a new 
procedure which~ as I read the opinion of the District Court 
. . ~~ 
was not considered or discussed • . Thus, we do not have the 
' '! 
benefit, on the substantive consfitµtional ·:issue, of any 
·--., 0 . d,ecision below as · to whether or not the· new procedure is 
~ > -.; :: : l_ _, : - ',~ •. : , ,,, ;.::. -• i:,alid. . -f.~, _ <-?- ,, .•• ,. ~ -- -- . ·.( • .: -¾-~ t, "' .... - ., 
~ /.,..._, :_.-.~-= r .. r· -,f.. 
t;i•~_· .. f ~i-f'2&t,Although I ;,. find the argum~nts - by both parties -
1~ JJ ... t...: ?,.., ~--:!<tl:I"~ 
. . 
as to mootness and ;s_tanding to be confused, and as failing 
'1:;,o;,'<-. ,,~~ ., 
/)',- !;: 
sharply often to dis.tinguish between the two, I have ;th~.':·, 
t;·•JI.··.-~ distinct impression t~at the case is "tilting with windmills'! 
~f'"·' ,,, 
~~"i, :.., 
in the sense that no one presently involved actually has 
• • .,1 a case or controversy. ~""l,"i,;'f', :_~~ 
,:,~., "= 
_.:.·,:~.:.:,:>- 1:il\~~·-·, If we were to reach the 
. "',} , ... ~"' ... ~ ... ~,~-.; ~ 
i~ ., y~,r,.:__'F~~--~~ I 
'•<r / ~ *'.-:>..:~~~'..:j't,..-,:-'",_';rJ• a;'£, ~.r_, · ... u ,jl'i:,,M , 
~
~• v. """••O, is;r _,, Y,:,'-1c, ~ ~--.,• 
• •, . , ,.~ -;;;,; • ~· . '..Jg,_~i;- t 't.i~-".r. ✓&--"r . l"' .... ~ .... 
- ~ ~ ~.&~•~jt ••~~<:"~~~~f"\!•t~- :,t;::.~I _.-•u"-::.._~-_• 
• o::;~~.:_•;,t~i"·, !,.!¥~~'bi;,.,- 1".t.."',"',;. P, · -~ :, ..... =~=~ -- ... ~ .~ " ... ' -- -











.f " - -
5. 
issue (Appellant has predicated his case primariiy on Fuentes 
and Sniacach - without coamenting on the modification of 
Fuentes by the Court's decision in Mitchell •v. G.E!!!£), we 
would not have the benefit of a Circuit Court u opinion·. 
Whatever may have been the deficienc~es of Illinois law 
as to lack of notice, the Secretary of State has now 
pr~ulgated new regulations and an interpretation of those 
Qy the DC and CA 7 would be helpful. 
J ' 
As will be evident from reading this memorandum, I 
have dictated it as I worked my way through the Brief, but 
I am still inclined to dismiss the case as iµlpr9vidently 
granted. 
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No. 73-858 Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit 
Union, Merchantile National Bank of 
Chica&£i_ etc. 
This is a sunnnary memo, primarily as a "memory jog" 
of the facts and issue presented by the above case. This 
memorandum reflects no specific analysis, and reflects only 
a most tentative and superficial viewpoint . 
.,,( * --;'( 7( "'J( 
This is an appeal from an Illinois three judge District 
Court, in which we postponed the jurisdictional issues until 
we hear the case. 
I must say , from a preliminary reading of the briefs, 
that I think the case should be dismissed as i mprovidently 
granted. The facts, issues and opinion of the DC, together 
with subsequent settlement in whole or in part of all of the 
claims, leaves the case in a position in which there seems to 
me to be no clear cut issue. Moreover, the Secretary of State 
of Illinois has substantially amended the procedure followed 
by him with respect to the issuance of "repossession certificates 
of title" to motor vehicles, and this in itself may make the 
case moot. 
The case, purporting to be a class action, is an 




Connnercial Code and the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code, as they 
relate to the repossession of automobiles upon default in 
payment of deferred installments and the issuance of repossession 
certificates of title by the Illinois Secretary of State. This 
is a 1983 suit for an injunction, declaratory judgment, and 
for compensatory and punitive damages. In view of the 
asserted state action, involving a statute of statewide 
applicability and with the Secretary of State named as a 
defendant, a three judge court was convened. On the basis 
of affidavits, that court dismissed the case on two grounds: 
( i ) lack of standing by the parties to maintain the action, 
and (ii) mootness, because the automobiles of the plaintiffs 
e had already been repossessed, resold, with titles transferred 
to individuals who were not joined as parties. 
-
This suit also was dismissed as a class action on 
the ground that there must always be a named party with 
standing who is entitled to maintain the suit as a member of 
the class he purports to represent. Absent such a party in 
this case, the DC dismissed the class action suit. 
The facts are difficult to state, as they vary from 
time to time, as did the parties and their status. One is 
inclined to believe that the suit must have been a "manufactured 
one", and that the named parties are being financed by someone -






The suit was originally brought by Mojica on March 16, 
1972. In July 1972, the Secretary of State proposed a new 
procedure with respect to the issuance of repossession 
title certificates, a procedure which included rather elaborate 
provisions for notice and opportunity to object. (See Appellee's 
Brief, p. 5). Appellee states in its Brief that on July 7, 
1972, Mojica approved the Secretary of State's new rules -
but apparently his suit was not dismissed. Thereafter, on 
September 28, 1972, Gonzalez and two other parties joined 
the litigation with an expanded and amended complaint, and 
with new defendants including Merchantile National Bank of 
Chicago. 
The DC decided the case on August 16, 1973 at which 
time apparently all four of the plaintiffs remained in the 
litigation. We are now told that "all named plaintiffs other 
than Mr. Gonzalez , and all named defendants other than 
Merchantile Bank and the Secretary of State" actually"settled 
with each other prior to the decision of the District Court 
and are no longer directly involved in the litigation". See 
n. 1, p. 3 of Appellee's Brief. We are further informed 
by Appellee's Brief (p. 9) that Gonzalez - the sole remaining 
named plaintiff - has settled his claim for damages 
(originally in the amount of $62,000) for $750. Gonzalez 
persists, however, in maintaining the class action on behalf 




As to the jurisidictional issue, appellee contends 
that a direct appeal to this Court is no longer available 
where a three judge court dismisses a case on grounds either 
of mootness or lack of standing, citing Rosado v. Wyman, 395 
U.S. 826 and 9 Moore's Federal Practice. It is argued that 
even at the commencement of the litigation, there was no 
basis for either injunctive or declaratory relief - and hence 
no case or controversy. The automobiles had been seized and 
resold, and the purchasers were not named as parties. No 
effective injunctive or declaratory relief could be given. 
Moreover, subsequently thereto (but before the amended 
- complaint was filed) the Secretary of State adopted a new 
procedure which - as I read the opinion of the District Court -
was not considered or discussed. Thus, we do not have the 
benefit, on the substantive constitutional issue, of any 
decision below as to whether or not the new procedure is 
-
valid. 
Although I find the arguments - by both parties -
as to mootness and standing to be confused, and as failing 
sharply often to distinguish between the two, I have the 
distinct impression that the case is "tilting with windmills" 
in the sense that no one presently involved actually has 
a case or controversy. 







issue (Appellant has predicated his case primarily on Fuentes 
and Sniacach - without commenting on the modification of 
Fuentes by the Court's decision in Mitchell v. Grant}, we 
would not have the benefit of a Circuit Court opinion. 
Whatever may have been the deficiencies of Illinois law 
as to lack of notice, the Secretary of State has now 
promulgated new regulations and an interpretation of those 
by the DC and CA 7 would be helpful. 
As will be evident from reading this memorandum, I 
have dictated it as I worked my way through the Brief, but 
I am still inclined to dismiss the case as improvidently 
granted. 










Mr. Justice Powell 
David Boyd 
-
DATE: October 15, 1974 
No. 73-858 Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees 
Credit Union - Appeal, 3 J.Ct. 
Perhaps the most important and challenging issue in this 
appeal is how to get out of it without doing any significant 
damage to federal jurisprudence. The case has some flavor 
of a "put up" suit, and the district court, while having its 
heart in the right place, had its head screwed on backwards. 
Such disastrous appeals are invitations to bad law. 
Jurisdiction: Moore's Theory 
A preliminary question is whether the three-judge court's 
rulings on standing and mootness are cognizable in this Court -
under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. Appellee asserts that there is a 
discernible and growing trend in this Court for holding that 
they are not, relying principally on 9 Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 110.13 [3] for that proposition. Appellants simply maintain 
that such an assertion is foreclosed by precedent, citing 
cases that Moore's maintains are about to be abandoned. 
The relevant portion of Moore's acknowledges that the Court 
previously has taken on direct appeal judgments of three-judge 
courts dismissing actions for lack of a case or controversy, 




- - 2. 
80 (1960), lack of standing, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), 
political question, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and 
abstention, Zwickler v. Koota, 398 U.S. 241 (1967). It asserts, 
however, that more recent cases indicate that the Court will 
not continue this practice. 
Moore's finds support for this assertion in the manner 
this Court has used Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Commission, 
393 U.S. 83 (1968), and Wilson v. Port of Lavaca, 391 U.S. 352 
(1968). Both were per curiam opinions. In Lavaca, the three 
judge court determined that the claim was not one that "must 
be heard by a three-judge court," and further ruled that the 
relief sought was not appropriate. The court dissolved itself, 
and the district judge thereafter adopted the three-judge 
court's action as its own. The per curiam opinion analogized 
that case to the instance in which the district judge refused 
to convene a three-judge court and denied relief. In thus 
determined that the proper route for appeal was to the court 
of appeals rather than the Supreme Court. Mengelkoch, also 
a per curiam. opinion, began the same way. The three-judge 
court dissolved itself after determining that it lacked juris-
diction. Thereafter, the district judge considered the matter 
and dismissed on grounds of abstention, stating in his memorandum 
that the opinion of the three-judge court was adopted by 
reference. Considering appellants' appeal from both judgments, 
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should be taken to the court of appeals, stating, "[W]e have 
held that when, as here, a three-judge court dissolves itself 
for want of jurisdiction, an appeal lies to the appropriate 
Court of Appeals and not to this Court." 393 U.S. at 84. 
Moore's concedes tht: Mengelkoch can be read only to stand for 
the proposition that three-judge court dissolutions for "want 
of j urisdiction" must be appealed in the court of appeals 
rather than the Supreme Court, but finds support for its 
reading of t he law in the manner that the Court has since used 
the case. It notes that in Rosado v. Wyman, 395 U.S. 826 (1969), 
the Court c ited Mengelkoch and Lavaca in dismissing a direct 
appeal from a three-judge court determination that an inter-
vening change in the law mooted the case and that the resultant 
challenge was not ripe. It also argues, with somewhat less 
force, that the Court's per curiam opinion in Mitchell v. 
Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970) can be read to support its view 
of the developing law. 
Moore's asserts that the trend of these cases "strongly 
suggest that the Court is moving toward the position that a 
direct appeal _will lie to it only when a three-judge court 
finds a substantial federal question, proceeds to decide it, 
and grants or denies an injunction." 9 Moore's Federal Practice 
,r 110.03[3] at 78-79. That may be as much advocacy as reporting. 
Its reading of Mitchell is quite a stretch. Moreover, Moore's 
fails to give proper recognition to a more recent case, Lynch 
v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) [You did not 
- • 4. 
participate in that case.] In Lynch a three-judge court dismissed 
- on grounds that it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U. S.C. § 1343(3). 
-
-
The Court rejected a claim that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
c:ppeal of a three-judge court decision dismissing for want of 
subject natter jurisdiction. In a footnote, Justice Stewart 
asserted that the question of availability of direct appeal depends 
on whether the three-judge court was properly convened. He noted 
that the Court had previously t aken direct appeals from three-judge 
court dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing 
Baker v. Carr, one of the cases that Moore's had identified as a 
dying breed. Appellant has cited other fairly recent cases where 
the Court reached the merits of three-judge court decisions turning 
on lack of standing,Granite Falls State Bank v. Schneider, 402 U.S. 1006 
(1971); Richardson v . Kennedy, 401 U.S. 901 (1971), and abstention, 
American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 
467 (1973). 
As my very cursory scan of the law reveals, there is na ~rigid 
cons i stency in this area. The trend definitely seems to be shift-
ing away fran Moore's thesis, as Moore'~ now acknowledges. 9 Moore's 
(1973 Supp) at 11. Still , I find Moore's and appellee's assertions 
intriguing. And my limited experience on the Court convinces me 
that this should be the law, even t hough it appears that it isn't. 
I will probably have no time for fur ther research on this point 
prior to argument, or even for much more thought than is revealed 
in this somewhat sketchy memorandum. I thought it best to develop 
the point now, however, bec.ause a ruling on thi s case will serve 
to pourtd another nail in the coffin of this theory. If the Coutrt 
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The Issues on Appeal 
Assuming that these questions are cognizable here rather 
than in the court of appeals, the question becomes which of the 
myriad problems does the Court wish to focus on in disposing 
of this mess. The most obvious candidate is mootness. 
The nature of this mootness ruling is somewhat unique. 
The mootness seems to go to the propriety of three-judge court 
,..--_, 
relief rather than to the existence of Article III jurisdiction. ---The seizure and sale of appellant's car, in the opinion of 
the district court, mooted his request for injunctive relief. 
It would not have deprived a single district court judge of 
jurisdiction to award damages, however. This case differs 
from Indiana Employment Commission v. Burney, 409 U.S. 540 
(1973), in that regard. There the class representative 
obtained the benefits she was seeking through the process of 
administrative appeal. Presumably no other action remained 
for a single district court to consider, save perhaps a 
highly tenuous action for damages resulting from the temporary 
deprivation of the benefits. 
Proper analysis of the mootness question would require 
a more discriminating examination of the class purportedly ---
represented by appellant Gonzalez than either the district 
court or appellee has provided. This, in turn, requires some 
elaboration of the rather complicated way in which appellant 







Litigation in this case was first instituted by ex-litigant 
Mojica. In March of 1972 Mojica filed an action to have the 
court declare Illinois Code Sections 9-503 and 9-504 unconstitu-
tional. He subsequently requested that a three-judge court 
be convened to hear his claim, and also that the district court 
--~ .... m, 
issue a temporary restraining order prohibiting the Illinois 
Secretary of State from transferring title and issuing new 
certificates of title after involuntary repossession until after 
the debtor was granted the opportunity to have a hearing before 
an impartial trier of fact. 
The state opposed the entry of a TRO. On July 3, 1972, 
it filed an opposition in which it indicated an intention to 
institute new procedures that would ameliorate plaintiff 
Mojica's concerns. The Secretary of State indicated he would 
promulgate new rules and regulations governing procedures for 
State transfer of title. The proposed new procedure would 
require that the creditor send the debtor notice of the potential 
application for transfer of title. Additionally, the State 
would only transfer titles ex parte in cases where the creditor 
submitted an affidavit indicating that he had sent notice by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, at least 15 days 
prior to the proposed transfer of title and that he had not 
received in response an affidavit of defense. If the debtor 






certified copy of an order of a court of competent j urisdiction 
before transferring title. App. at 19-20. In oral argument 
on the motion for TRO, the State indicated that this was more 
in the nature of an "office policy" than a formally promulgated 
rule. 
The district court denied the motion for TRO on July 7th. 
The same day the district court convened a three judge court 
and plaintiff Mojica amended his complaint to include a court 
attempting to establish a class action. Appellant Gonzalex 
still had not appeared. 
In September appellant Gonzalez joined the action. He, 
Mojica, and others submitted an amended complaint seeking to 
represent the class composed of: 
all persons who are debtors under security agree-
ments invoking motor vehicles and who have had or 
may have their automobiles or other motor vehicles 
repossessed and sold for an alleged default with-
out prior notice and an opportunity to be heard 
and whose certificate of title has been or will be 
terminated and transferred by the Secretary of 
State. 
App. at 31. Mojica and the others have since dropped out, and 
Gonzalez is t he sole remaining class representative. 
The definition of the class is somewhat deceptive. In 
reality there are two classes, and the importance of 
distinguishing them is heightened by the state's amendment 
of its practice of transferring automobile titles. 
Title cannot be transferred in Illinois without the 
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that the Gonzale& complaint was filed, the Secretary of State 
had devised procedures that seem to assure that the transfer 
will not likely occur in advance of provision of notice to 
the debtor and the passage of time permitting him to assert 
a defense. 
The state's alteration of its administrative practice --------------- -serves to define the classes. One is the class of persons 
I 
who lost their automobiles and title under the prior state 
practice. (Those who "have had" in the words of the complaint.) 
The other is the class of persons who have lost their cars 
and title following the state's amendment of procedure, which 
was announced in court on July 7 and apparently adopted in 
August. 
The constitutional claim of one class differs significantly 
from that of the other class. The second class (the post-
reform class) have a much diminished claim to lack of notice 
prior to transfer of title. Indeed, unless the form of notice 
is deficient they appear to have no claim at all. And the 
form of notice is not likely to be deficient in light of the 
fact that the creditor can reasonably be expected to have 
the debtor's current address. 
The first class would have seemed to have had a stronger 
case on the merits, since their claim of lack of notice prior 
to the State's transfer of title is more convincing. However, 
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it seems inappropriate for a three-judge court to act. It 
makes little sense to declare invalid and enjoin a procedure 
that the state has itself long-since abandoned. Appellant's 
claim that such a ruling is necessary to prevent the Secretary 
from slipping back into his old ways is sheer speculation. 1 
All they need do if he slips back into his old ways is send 
Gonzalez out to buy another tin-lizzie on credit. 
Gonzalez' role in representing the classes is even more 
tenuous. As a practical matter, he is a member of the first 
class. His car was repossessed on or about April 25, 1972 -
prior to the state's revision of policy. The state's alteration 
of policy effectively makes him a class representative without 
a cause. Equally important, he is probably not qualified 
to represent that class. The briefs indicate that he accepted 
a settlement for damages for seizure and sale of the car. 
Under O'Shea v. Littleton, 415 U.S. __ (1974) and Burney, supra, 
he is not a proper representative of that class. 
There is some question whether the district court should 
have proceeded to hear the claim of the second class so soon 
after the significant alteration of the challenged state 
procedure. Wright v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 208 (1972), suggests . 
that it should not. In any event, appellant Gonazalez is not 
qualified to represent that class. That class is comprised 
of persons who had their automobiles repossessed and their 
titles transferred under the new state procedure. Gonzalez 
does not fit that description. Moreover, to the extent that 
1. One ave1:tiIJgP· a "return to old ways" as a bas is for fincili.n@ga 
1live ·contlre.v:ersy must demonstrate that "there is no reasonable expecta-
tion that the wrong will be repeated." United States v. W.T. Grant, 
345 u s 629 633 (1952). That ''heavy burden", id., woula appear to 
be met here,'where the Secretary has apparently maintained this practice 
for two years. 
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Gonzalez argues that he represents that broad class of persons 
fearing future repossession and title transfer, he has not 
alleged a controversy of sufficient concreteness. There may 
be representatives for that class, but Gonzalez is not one of 
them. A proper representative would at least have to allege 
that he had purchased an automobile on an installment sale 
basis and that he had a reasonable basis for fearing loss of 
that automobile through the operation of the Illinois reposses-
sion and resale procedure. Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 
452 (1974). 
The State Action Question: 
If you agree with my mootness analysis, there is no 
need to reach other issues. If you disagree, however, the 
next logical question would seem to be whether there is 
jurisdiction over the private party under§ 2281. That 
section provides for actions seeking to restrain actions of 
a "state officer." Clearly the Secretary of State qualifies 
as a proper defendant under that statute. Whether the 
Secretary's presence suffices to provide pendent jurisdiction 
over the private creditor-repossessor is morequestionable, 
however. I have only had time to look at the cases rather 
quickly. None of the cases cited by appellant seems to be 
one in which pendent jurisdiction supported three-judge court 
jurisdiction over a pendent party. All appear to be cases 
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involving the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over related 
claims involving the same parties. 
I don't think that this would be a very good case for 
deciding the pendent party question, especially in light of 
the change in Illinois procedure. Some of the other cases 
here on cert seem to provide cleaner vehicles for resolution 
of this issue. My recollection is that the Ninth Circuit case, 
in which Judge Hufstedler dissented, presents the best case. 
I question whether there is any current need to decide 
this issue at all, however. There appears to be no split in 
the lower courts. And the utilities case would seem to offer 
the Court a chance to ease into state action questions in 
another context. I would ~ 1~ the issue in this case 
and dismiss the hold cases. 
Standing: 
If this case ever gets to the standing question, reversal 
would be required. The lower court's ruling on that point is 
simply absurd. Analytically, the existence of alternative 
remedies is irrelevant to the question of standing. And in 
this case the alternative remedy was quite distinct from that 
sought by appellant Gonzalez. 
D. B. 
ss 




-. ';) ~ '/? ~ ~~ ~ ~ 
: ~ ~ ~ 
I l 
·~~ ~ ~ r¼'~ . z 
·oYJPp ·~ 
---i--o-y . p ~ ~ ~~ '/ 







~ s I~ ~ ~ : ~~ CH 
~ ~s { (~. or ~ 
( ----.--.-,.A".--p V?' ~ ~ .s: ) , ~ 
~ ~., -~ o->-z-._ ~?-~ -----v.? 
~~ ar-n-.-?-112/Y} ~ -yyc--,,.~  ~-2-f 
~ ~nov '7?.di5fiP r ~.>? i, ~ 
(~)~--~-
< ( ~ • ~ /"Yl4 ~ 0-, 
. ~ ~rY/7 0' --pz, ~-n--/-~ ~ ~ ~~ 
~ ~~ o')-f ~ Jnr-v ~~-f ~ 
~ ('~~~ g -r-v) •~r-v;--~~ 
-1> ~~ ~ r-,,v~ ~ ~ ~ ... ~ 
~ ~ JnP'V ~ : ~ ~ ~ 










~ ~ ~ ~s ~ . ?-e?S 
----rrz.J , ~~..? ~~ 

















... '. .. . . 
I - - 1-.+ f To: :1·, 3 Ch (. ~ lt.~_:•; -,c11 
i,...-
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
I~:t. 
l' I' ....... 
l•r 
i. 
Jus ';..:.ce Dc;,,'.nas 
,T ,,st:: ce B:;:·r,nn2.n 




,i. .. .. · i t .• 1y_..iist 
''r J. 
N(JV 2 6 1974 
No. 73-858 
C1roJ. te~: ■ 
Alfredo Gonzalez, individually 
and On Behalf of All Others 
Similarly Situated, 
Appellant, 
Recirculated : ■ 
v. 
Automatic Employees Credit 
Union et al. 
On Appeal from the 
United States District 
Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois. 
[December -, 1974] 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This is an appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 from an 
order of a three-judge court dismissing the appellant's 
complaint for lack of "standing." 1 We deferred con-
sideration of our jurisdiction until the hearing on the 
merits. 415 U. S. 947. For the reasons that follow, we 
have concluded that the District Court's order is not 
directly appealable to this Court. 
The appellant Gonzalez and three other named plain-
tiffs brought a class action in the District Court attacking 
as unconstitutional various provisions of the Commercial 
Code and Motor Vehicle Code of Illinois governing re-
possession, retitling. and resale of automobiles purchased 
on an instalment payment basis under security agree-
ments.2 The plaintiffs alleged that the statutory scheme 
1 Mo1ica Y. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 363 F. Supp. 143. 
2 Ill Rev. Stat. c. 26. §§ 9-503 and 9-504, and Ill. Rev. Stat. 
c. 95½, §§ 3-114 (b) , 3-116 (b), and 3-612. 
~;~~ 
X?-( 




2 GONZALEZ v EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION 
violated a debtor-purchaser's rights-under the Four-
teenth, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution-to notice, hearing, and impartial 
determination of contractual default prior to repossession 
of the car, transfer of title to the secured party, or resale 
of the car by the secured party. The plaintiffs sought a 
declaratory judgment to this effect, a permanent injunc-
tion, and compensatory and punitive damages for past 
violations of their alleged constitutional rights. A three-
judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281:3 
The named plaintiffs sought to represent the class of all 
debtor-purchasers, under security agreements involving 
motor vehicles, "who have had or rpay have their auto-
mobiles or other motor vehicles repossessed for an alleged 
default, without prior notice or an opportunity to be 
heard ... and whose certificate of title has been or will 
be terminated and transferred by the Secretary of State." 
The named defendants were the Secretary of State of 
Illinois, responsible for transferring title under the chal-
lenged statute:3, and five organizations operating as secured 
creditors in the motor vehicle field. The complaint also 
designated a ~la_§s, consisting of all secured 
creditors who may, "upon their unilateral determination 
of default by debtor-obligees,'' seek to repossess, and to 
dispose of, motor vehicles under the challenged statutes. 
The pleadmgs and suppl mentary documents showed 
3 Section 2281 provides· 
"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enfoce-
ment , operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the 
action of any officer of ,mch State in the enforcement or execution 
of snch statute or of an order made by an administrative board or 
commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by an 
district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitu-
tionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and 
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that Gonzalez had purchased a car on a retail installment 
contract, which had later bf'en assigned to the defendant-
appellee , Mercantile National Bank of Chicago (Mercan-
tile). Before this lawsuit was begun, Mercantile had 
repossessed the car , resold it to a third party, and ar-
ranged a title transfer to that party through the office of 
the Secretary of State. The complaint alleged that all 
of this had been done without notice to Gonzalez, and 
that he had not in fact been in default under the install-
ment contract. On the basis of these facts, the three-
judge court dismissed the complaint.4 
The court held that Gonzalez lacked "standing" to 
contest the constitutionality of the statutory scheme. 
First, the court observed that enjoining future enforce-
men of the scheme would be a "useless act" so far as 
Gonzalez was concerned, since the events of which he 
complained-the repossession and resale of his J)J!,r-had 
already taken place.5 S~lithe court reasoned that 
the compl";:int, because it alleged that Gonzalez had not 
been in default, was directed not at the constitutional 
validity of the statutory scheme but only at Mercantile's 
abuse of the scheme. Noting that the ~atutorY-.pro'li-
~authorized repossession and title transfer only upon 
default, and provided for injunctive relief and damages 
w~ creditors acted in the absence of OE.zfo11lt, the court, 
held that Gonzafez lacked standing to litigate "the valid-
ity of these statutes when properly applied to debtors 
actually in default .'' 6 Thecomplaint was dismissed 
4 Since only Gonzalez has :;ou~ht review of the three-judge court's 
dismissal of the complaint, we confine our summary of that. court's 
analysis to the specific facts of his case . The Dist rict Court's 
analysis was similar, however, with regard to each of the named 
plainttffa. 
5 Mojica v. Automoti'.c Employees Credit Union, supra, at 145-146. 
6 Id., at 145. 
- -
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"[s]ince all plaintiffs in this case fail to present a claim 
which can be reached on the merits." 7 
II 
Appealing here individually and as a purported class 
representative, Gonzalez seeks reversal of the District 
Court's "standing" determination, and an order directing 
the reinstatement of his complaint. Our appellate jur-
isdiction is controlled by 28 U. S. C. § ~ -- -"Except as otherwise provided by law, any party 
may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order 
~~~1i or denying, after notice and hearing, ~ 
interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil 
a~ suit-·or proceeding required by any Act of 
Congress to be heard and determined by a district ----- .....___ -Court of three judges." .._____,. __ -
Gonzalez's jurisdictional argument is very simple: The 
dismissal of his complaint did in fact "deny" him the 
permanent' injunctive relief he requested, and the case 
was one "required .. . to be heard and determined" by 
three judges because the several conditions precedent to 
conyening a three-judge court under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 
and 2284 (1970) were met. That is, the constitutional 
question raised was substantial; 8 the action sought to 
enjoin a state official from executing statutes of state-
wide application; " and the complaint at least formally 
alleged a basis for equitable relief.10 
Mercantile denies that all of these conditions were met, -but pl~~s greater emphasis on an entirely different 
r~ 1253. Mercantile argues that an inj~ 
is not "denied~ or purposes of § 1253 unless the denial 
7 ld ., at 146. 
8 See Goosby v. Osser. 402 U. S. 512. 
9 See Moody v. Flowers, 387 U. S. 97. 
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j~sed UP().? ap adverse determination on _ the~erits ) 
of the plaintiff's constitutional attack on the state stat-
utes. In th; present case. injunctive relief was denied 
not because the court found the challenged statutes con-
stitutionally sound, but only because the court found 
that Gonzalez lacked standing to make the challenge. 
Merqantile argues that a dismissal premised on grounds 
short of the constitutional merits should be reviewed in 
the first instance by the Court of Appeals, rather than by 
direct appeal to this Court. 
It is an understatement to say that this argument is 
not wholly supported by precedent, for the fact is that 
the Court has on several occasions entertained direct ap-
peals from three-judge court orders denying injunctions 
on grounds short of the merits. 11 But it is also a fact 
that in the area of statutory three-judge court law the 
doctrine of 'stare deci,sis has historically been accorded 
considerably less than its usual weight. These procedural 
statutes are very awkwardly drafted,12 and in struggling 
11 Cases in which the District Court had denied injunctive relief 
for want of standing, or of justiciability generally: Florida Lime & 
Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73 ; Baker v. Carr, 369 
U. S. 186; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83; Richardson v. Kennedy, 401 
U. S. 901; Granite Fall.'! State Bank v. Schneider, 402 U. S. 1006. 
Cases where -deniel was for want of subject-matter jurisdiction ; 
Lynch v. Household Firumce Corp., 405 U.S. 538; Carter v. Stanton, 
405 U. S. 669. Cases where denial was on grounds of abstention 
or for want of equitable jurisdiction: Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 ; 
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241; Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225; 
American Trial Lawyers Assn. v New Jersey Supreme Court, 409 
U.S. 467. 
12 Perhaps the oddest feature of § 1253 is that it conditions this 
Court's appellate JUrisdict10n on whether the three-judge court was 
correctly convened. But the Court has abjured this literalistic 
readmg of the sta tute and has not hesitated to exercise jurisdiction 
"to determme the authority of the court below and 'to make such 
corrective order as may be appropriate to the enforcement of the 
limitations which that section imposes.'" Bailey v. Patterscm, 360 
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to make workable sense of them. the Court has not in-
frequently been induced ~trace its steps.'3 Writing 
for the Court on one of these occasions, Mr. Justice Har-
lan noted : 
"Unless inexorably commanded by statute, a pro- ) . 
cedural principle of this importance should not be 
kept on the books in the name of stare decisis once 
it is proved to be unworkable in practice; the mis- ( 
chievous consequences to litigants and courts alike 
from the perpetuation of an unworkable rule are too 
great." Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116. 
The reading given to § 1253 by the appellant Gon-
zalez is not "inexorably commanded by statute." For 
the statute "authorizes direct review by this Court ... as 
a means of accelerating a ~det~rmination on the 
merits." Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S., at 119. It 
is true that dismissal of a complaint on grounds short of 
the merits does "deny" the injunction in a literal sense, 
but a literalistic approach is fully persuasive only if fol-
lowed without deviation. In fact, this Court's interpre-
tation of the three-judge court statutes has frequently 
deviated from the path of literalism.u If the opaque 
U. S. 31, 34, quoting Gully v. Instate Natural Gas Co., 292 U. S. 
16, 18. 
13 Fo, example: Compare ldlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. 
Epstein, supra, with Stratton v. St . Louis S. W. R. Co., 282 U. S. 
10 (whether review of a single judge's refusal to convene a three-
Judge court is available in the Court of Appeals); compa re Kennedy 
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144 with FHA v. The Darlington, 
Inc. , 358 F S. 84, 87 (whether three judges are required where only 
ctecla.ratory relief 1s requestrd); compare Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 
:382, U. S. 111 with Kesler v. Dept. of Public Safety, 369 U. S. 153 
(whethe1 a three-judge court is required when a complaint seeks 
to enjoin a state statute on the ground that it violates the Supremacy 
Clause). 
14 Read literally, § 1253 would give this Court appellate jurisdic-
t ion over even a single judge's order granting or denying an injunction 
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terms and prolix syntax of these statutes were given their 
full play, three-j udge courts would be convened, and 
mandatory appeals would lie here, in many circumstances 
where such extraordinary procedures would serve no 
discernible purpose 
if the "action, ,mit, or proceeding" were in fact one "required ... 
to be heard and determined'' by three judges. But we have glossed 
the provision so as to restrict our jurisdiction to orders actually 
entered by three-judge courts. See Ex parte Metropolitan Water 
Co. v. West Virginia, 220 U. S. 539, 545. 
A smgle Judge is literally prohibited to "dismiss the action, or· 
enter a summary or final judgmene': in any case required to be 
heard by three judges. 28 U. S. C. § 2284 (5). Read literally, this 
provision might be held to prohibit a single Judge from dismissing· 
a case unless he has determined that it fails to meet the requirements 
of §§ 2281 or 2282, See Bereuffy, The Three-Judge Federal Court, 
15 Rocky Mtn. Law Rev. 64, 73-74 (i942), and Note, 28 Minn. 
Law Rev. 131, 132 (1944). But we have always recognized a single 
judge's power to dismiss a complaint for want of general subject-
matter jurisdiction, without 1nquiry into the additional requisites 
specified in §§ 2281 and 2282. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30, 31; 
Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S., at 33; Jdlewild Bon Voyage Liquor 
Corp. , 370 U. S., at 715; Goosby v. Osser, supra. 
While the literal terms of the three-judge court statutes give us 
appellate jurisdiction over any three-judge court order granting or 
denying an "interlocutory or permanent mjunction," we have in 
fact disclaimed jurisdiction over interlocutory orders denying per-
manf>nt inj11ndions, Ooldsteir1 v. Cox, 396 U S 471, and Rockefeller 
v. Catholic l'vledical Center, 397 U. S. 820. 
While § 2281 requires a three-judge court where the injunction 
will operate against any :;tat£> "statute," we have construed the term 
narrowly, to include only enactments of statewide application, Moody 
v Flowers, 387 U. S 97, 101. Cf. King Mfg. Co. v. City Council 
'.Jf Auyustn, 277' U. S. 100, 103-104, construmg far more broadly the 
ierm ··statute" as used in the predecessor to 28 U.S. C. § 1257 (2). 
While § 2281 calls for three judges to enjoin a statute "upon the· 
ground" of its "unconstitutionality," we have held that three judges 
are not in fact neces:;ary where the unconstitutionality of the statute 
is obv10us and patent , Bailey v . .Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, or where the 
const itut10nal challenge is grounded on the Supremacy Clause, Swift 
,& Co v W ickham . supra. See aiso n. 12, supra. 
- -
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Congress established the three-judge court apparatus 
for one reason: to save state and federal statutes from 
improvident doom, on constitutional grounds, at the 
hands of a single federal district judge.15 But some of 
the literal worrls of the statutory apparatus bear little or 
no relation to that underlying policy, and in construing 
these we have stressed that the three-j udge court proce-
dure is "not a rneasur0 of broad social policy to be con-
strued with great liberality.'' Phillips v. United States, 
312 C". S. 246. at 251. See also Kesler v. Department of 
Public Safety. 369 U. S. 153. 156-157; Swift & Co. v. 
Wickham, 382 U. fl., at 124 ; Allen v. State Board of Elec-
tions, 393 U. S. 544, 561-562. 
The words of ~ 1253 governing this Court's appellate 
jurisdiction over orders denying injunctions fall within 
this canon of narrow construction. Whether this juris-
dict1011 be read broadly or narrowly, there will be no im-
p~ct on the underlyillg congressional policy of ensuring 
this Court's swift review of three-judge court orders that 
~°ilt:inJuncfions. Furthermore, only a narrow construc-
tion is consonant with the overriding policy. historically 
encouraged by Congress, of minimizing the mandatory 
~-.. _..... 
docket of this Court in the interests of sound judicial 
administra tion.16 
15 Phillip~ " ['mted Stat 00 • 312 l'. S. 246, 250-251 ; Bailey 
Patterson, :369 F. S., at ;3;3_ The Court ,;ketchcd the leg1s!at1ve 
1uotor~ of tlw thn'e-.1 udge cou rt statutes m Swift & Co. ,·. Wickham. 
:382 l'. 8., at lHi-119. SC'c' abo Currie, The ThrC'e-Judge Distnct 
CQ\1rt m Con<'tJtutional Ln,gatwn, 32 U. Chi. Law Rev . 1, 3-12 
(1Db4J; :\"ote, Tlw Thrrr-Ju<lgC' District Court: Scopr and Pro-
rPdnre undrr § 2281. i7 Harv. Law Rev . 299 , 299-301 (1963). 
1o "[IJnasmuch as th,,- procedure abo brings direct review of a 
d1~tric· <:ourr to tl11,- Court , any loo:;e construction of the require-
ments . would defeat the purposes of Cougress , as expres,;ed by 
the .Junsdict1onal Act of February 13, 1925, to keep within narrow 
c·onfine,- our ,ippellatP do!'ket.'' Phillips v. United States. 312 U . S., 
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Mercantile argues that ~ 1253 should be read to limit 
our direct revie,v of three-judge court orders denying in-
.functions to those that rei::t upon resolution of the consti-
tutional merits of the case. There would be evident 
virtues to this rule. It would lend symmet;y to the 
'ourt's jurisdiction since. in reviewing orders granting 
injunctions, the Court is uecessarily dealing with a resolu-
tion of the merits. While issues short of the merits-
such as justiciability. E:ubject-matter jurisdiction. equit-
able jurisdiction. and abstension-are often of more than 
trivial consequence. that alone does not argue for our re-
viewing them on direct appeal. Discretionary review in 
any case would remain available. informed by the medi-
ating wisdom of a court of appeals. Furthermore, the 
courts of appeals might in rnany instances give more de-
tailed consideration to these issues than this Court, which 
disposes of most mandatory appeals in summary fashion. 17 
versity Committee. 399 0. S. :38:3. :3?<7-388; Allen\'. Board of Elec-· 
tious. 39:3 F. S. , at 5n2; Bd. of Regents v. New Left Education 
ProjPtt. 404 U. S. 5-J.l. 54:3. 
··Tlw hi,-tor~- of hit trr-ch1~· ,iucliciar~- act,; is largely the story of 
rr,tnrting thr nght of appra l to thr Supreme Court." F . Frank-
fmtrr & J. Laudi,-, Thr Bu~ine~s of t hr Supreme Court 119 ( 1928) . 
To th1, trrnd of rrform. thr Co11rt', mamlator~- appellate jurisdiction 
nndrr 1 hr threc'-.iudgr eo11rt ,tatutr,; rrpre,;rnt8 a mAjor. and incrras-
i'i1gl _\ cu11 t ru\·pr,-;ial , l'X<:Pptio11 . Tht· uumber of case~ heard by three-• 
jmlg\' court,; ha,- dramatica!l~- incrra,-;rd in the pa~t decade. See 
...\.mnw rman, Thr<'P-.TndgP Court~: See How They Run 1, 52 F . R. D. 
29:3. :~0+-:301i : Annual Report of t lw Director of the Administrative' 
OffirP of thr l -nited State~ Cour1:-: . 197-1. IX 44. ::-.;early a quarter· 
of thl' S11preml' Court '::; oprnionl:' 111 the 197:2 Term were in three-
judg(' court ca,;c•,-;. S~·mpoi::1um, The Freund Report: A StntisticAI 
A11al>·:;i~ and Critique. 27 Rutger:; L. Rev. 878, 902 (1974). 
' 7 Tiu,-; Court tYpic:ill~ di~po,;es :;ummnrily of between ¾ and ¾ 
of the thn.'l' -J11clgc• romt appeall:' filPd each term. See Symposium, 
supra . 27 Rutg<'r:; L . RPv., at 902-90:3; Douglas. Thr Supreme· 
Court and lt,-; C':i:;e Load , 45 Cornell L. Q. 401,410 (1960) . It seems 
m urc- t h1J11 probalik tliut many o( the:;e case:;, while unworthy cu.' 
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But the facts of this case do not require us to explore \ 
the full sweep of Mercantile's argument. Here the three-.__ 
judge court ·dismissed the complaint for lack of "stand-
ing." This grounr.l for decision, that the complaint was 
nonjusticiable, was not merely short of the ultimate 
merits; it was also, like an absence of statutory subject-
matter jurisdiction, ago~d upon which_a single j~dge 
could have declined to convene a three-judge court, or 
upon which the three-judge court could have dis;olved 
itself, leaving final disposition of the complaint to a single 
judge.18 
A three-judge court is not required where the District 
Court itself lacks jurisdiction of the complaint or the com-
plaint is not justiciable in the federal courts. See Ex 
parte Poresky, 290 U.S., at 31. It is now well sett.led that 
refusal to request the convention of a three-judge court, 
dissolution of a three-judge court, and dismissal of a com-
plaint by a single judge are orders reviewable in the 
Court of Appeals, not here.in If the three-judge court 
plenary consideration here, would benefit from the normal appellate 
review available to smgle-judge cases in the courts of appeals. 
18 See Rosado v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 1354, appeal dismissed, 
391; U.S. 826; M engelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 284 F . Supp. 
950, vacated to permit appeal to Court of Appeals, 393 U. S. 83 ; 
Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F. 2d 833, 837; American Commuters 
A.s.sn v. Levitt, 279 F. Supp. 40, aff'd, 405 F . 2d 1148; Hart v. 
Kennedy, 314 F. Supp. 823, 824. 
rn Where a single Judge refuses to request the convention of a 
three-judge court, but retains jurisdiction, review of his refusal may 
be had in the Court of Appeals, see Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor 
C'orp. v. Epstein, supra, ar,d Schackman v. Arnebergh, 387 U.S. 427, 
either through petition for writ of mandamus or through a certified 
interlocutol') appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b) . These also are 
the routes of review of a three-judge court's decision to dissolve 
itself, Mengelkoch v Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 393 U. S. 83, 
and Wilson v. Port Lavaca. 391 U. S. 352. Where a single judge 
has d1sprn,ed of the complaint through a final order, appeal lies to 
the Court of Appeals undn 28 U S. C. § 1291. 
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in the present case had dissolved itself on grounds that 
"standing" was absent, and had left subsequent dismissal 
of the complaint to a single judge, this Court would 
thus clearly have lacked appellate jurisdiction over both 
orders. The same would have been true if the dissolution 
and dismissal decisions had been made simultaneously, 
with the single judge merely adopting the action of the 
three-judge court.20 The locus of appellate review should 
not turn on such technical distinctions. 
Where the three-judge court perceives a ground justi-
fying both dissolution and dismissal, the chronology of 
decisionmaking is typically a matter of mere convenience 
or happenstance. Our mandatory docket must rest on 
a firmer foundation than this. We hold, therefore, that 
when a three-judge court denies a plaintiff injunctive re-
lief on grounds which, if sound, would have justified dis-
solution of the court as to that plaintiff, or a refusal to 
request the convention of a three-judge court ab initio, 
review of the denial is available only in the Court of 
Appeals. 
In the present case, accordingly, the correctness of the 
District Court's view of Gonzalez's standing to sue is for 
the Court of Appeals to determine. We intimate no 
views on the issue, for we are without jurisdiction to con-
sider it. 2-1 We simply vacate the order before us and 
remand the case to th e District Court so that a fresh 
order may be entered and a timely appeal prosecuted to 
the Court of Appeals.22 
It is so ordered. 
20 Wilson v. Port Lavaca, supra. 
21 It appears that Gonzalez and Mercantile settled the farmer's 
damage claim while this appeal was pending. The Court of Appeals 
will, of course, be free to consider this new development in appraising 
the correctness of the dismissal of the complaint. See SEC v. 
Medical Committee for Human R ights, 404 U. S. 403 . 
22 28 U. S. C. § 1291. See Afengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare 
Comm'n, 393 U. S. 83, 84. 
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